In 2011, our hospital started a new system of 100% procedural audit of anaesthesia work, in which we incorporated the reporting of critical incidents. This monitoring of critical incidents has enabled identification of the spectrum of incidents and risk factors and helped in the education of trainees and specialists. In this review, we analyse 379 incidents that had been reported among 44,915 anaesthetics administered in a two-year period. The risk of incidents was higher in patients of lower American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status, anaesthesia of long duration and anaesthesia carried out after-hours. The most common incidents were airway problems and drug administration problems. Fifty-nine percent of incidents were evaluated to be preventable and adverse outcomes occurred in 48% of cases. Human factors were the major contributors to incidents. We suggest that incorporating critical incident reporting as part of a 100% procedural audit facilitated, rather than discouraged, the reporting of critical incidents, even though reporting was not anonymous. The rate of incident reporting increased from 0.37% to 0.84%.
The incidence of mortality and severe permanent disability attributable solely to anaesthesia is now very low, in part due to several measures adopted or pioneered by the anaesthesia specialty. Among these is the review of critical incidents or near-misses to identify both human and system factors that contribute to incidents. Our department has had a voluntary anaesthesia critical incident reporting system for many years but there were concerns about under-reporting. In 2011, our department implemented a '100% procedural audit' system for anaesthesia care, as part of our hospital's quality improvement strategy for all procedural specialties. In this procedural audit, we incorporated the reporting of critical incidents. We aimed to encourage the reporting of incidents and discussion in a 'blame-free' culture for all to learn and to prevent future incidents.
In this review of all the reported critical incidents over a two-year period since the implementation of our audit system, we studied the incidence of different types of critical incidents, the outcomes and the risk factors leading to incidents. We aimed to improve awareness of the problems and to mitigate the risk factors where feasible.
Materials and methods
In 2011, we implemented an audit system of all anaesthesia work in our department as part of continuous quality improvement and patient safety work. Our hospital had mandated a 100% audit of procedural specialties in the hospital, including all surgical specialties, anaesthesia, cardiology and gastroenterology. The Domain Specific Review Board exempted our audit work from formal review (Letter dated 19 April, 2012), as this had been mandated by the hospital and there was no intervention in patients' treatment. We also received approval from our Hospital Medical Board to publish the findings (letter dated 13 November, 2014 ).
An audit form was completed for every patient, recording data on patients' characteristics, medical problems and anaesthesia technique. The audit forms were available in all operating theatres and other locations where anaesthetic care was provided.
We incorporated reporting of critical incidents into the audit forms. We included both incidents where the patients encountered harm and 'near-misses', where patients did not suffer harm but could have if the problems had not been rapidly resolved. The 'near-misses' were in accordance with an earlier definition: "an event under anaesthesia care which had the potential to lead to substantial negative outcome if left to progress" 1,2 . The critical incidents were described in free-text boxes on the form to provide information on the circumstances of the patient, details of the incident, contributing factors, minimising factors, and outcomes. Suggested corrective strategies were also written on the form.
In our department, the vast majority of anaesthetics are conducted by teams of two, comprising a specialist and trainee, and these completed the audit forms. The anaesthetist in the post-anaesthesia care unit ensured that a form was completed for each patient and collected the forms upon completion. We checked the forms for completeness of data and collated the critical incidents. We reviewed the collated incidents and presented and discussed the incidents at monthly teaching sessions that the entire department was expected to attend. Following each session, we emailed a summary of the discussion to all the anaesthetists in our department. We did not collect any data on patients after discharge from the post-anaesthesia care unit, so we could not capture incidents after this period.
In this review, we evaluated the incidence and spectrum of critical incidents, risk factors for incidents, the contributing factors, minimising factors and corrective measures. We reviewed the anaesthesia records to supplement the information in the incident reports. We classified the types of incidents as anaesthesia machine and breathing circuit, other equipment, pharmacological, cardiac, airway incidents or other incidents.
In the reports, anaesthetists noted whether they considered that the incidents were preventable, unpreventable or that they were undecided on this. Two members of the review team who had not been involved in any of the cases independently reviewed the incidents and the anaesthesia records to evaluate the preventability of the incidents.
We evaluated the risk of critical incidents with worsening American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) physical status, emergency operations, increasing duration of surgery, and anaesthesia conducted after-hours.
Statistical Analysis
We calculated the odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals) to estimate the magnitude of effect of risk factors. We used Microsoft Office Excel 2003 (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA) for these calculations. The identity of the anaesthetists was not entered in the database used for analysis.
Results
During the study period, 379 incidents were reported among 44,915 anaesthetic care episodes, an incidence of 0.84%. The majority of our incidents happened during anaesthesia for patients presenting for elective surgery (74.7%) who did not have severe coexisting disease (ASA 1 [26.6%] or ASA score of 2 [41.4%]). Ninety-six (25.3%) incidents occurred in patients having urgent or emergent anaesthesia.
The most common incidents related to the airway (55.7%), including bronchospasm, laryngospasm, dental trauma, difficult airway management, reintubation, failure to intubate and pulmonary aspiration. Pharmacological problems were the next most common, including drug administration errors and adverse drug reactions ( Table 1 ). The most common cardiovascular incidents were hypotension due to haemorrhage, arrhythmia, myocardial ischaemia and cardiac arrest. Thirty-three (8.7%) were related to the anaesthetic circuit or other equipment, including circuit disconnection, circuit leakage, tracheal tube obstruction due to bending of the tube, blockage of end-tidal CO 2 sampling line and syringe pump problems.
The study team considered 224 of 379 incidents (59.1%) as preventable, 144 (38.0%) as unpreventable and were undecided in 11 reports. Six of the incidents considered preventable resulted in major morbidity.
The incidents occurred most commonly during the induction phase of anaesthesia (39.3%), followed by the maintenance phase (35.1%), emergence phase (14.8%) and in the post-anaesthesia care unit (8.4%) ( Table 2 ). Factors contributing to the occurrence of an incident are listed in Table 3 . These were mostly human factors and included errors of judgement, faulty technique and failure to check drugs or machine. These errors of judgement involved the timing of insertion and removal of airway devices, the need for intubation, the need for rapid sequence induction and judging the extent of difficulty in airway management. Failures to check did not occur before the induction of anaesthesia; rather, these involved failures to check the breathing circuit, the intravenous lines after positioning of the patient and the setting of the ventilators. Inattention to detail contributed to inappropriate speeds of drug injection, patient positioning problems, not noticing that tapes securing the airway devices had come loose or not noticing early enough that physiological parameters had increased or decreased outside of the normal range. Severe patient illness and surgical team contribution were also common contributing factors in 107 and 55 incidents, respectively.
The drug administration errors in particular were associated with human factors, including failure to check the syringe, inattention, communication problems, errors of judgement and haste. Of the 13 incidents involving drug error, eight involved picking up the wrong syringe and administration of the wrong drug.
The factors minimising the adverse effects of the incidents are noted in the Table 4 . Early detection with monitors and prior experience of the anaesthetists were most frequently cited as minimising adverse effects. This was followed by good health of the patients and the availability of skilled assistance. 'Good luck' was cited in 19 reports and, on review of the anaesthesia records, the good outcome in these incidents did indeed seem fortuitous.
The immediate and final outcomes are noted in Table  5 . Among the immediate outcomes, major physiological changes occurred in 73 incidents, such as laryngospasm, hypotension and desaturation in 68, 62 and 49 incidents, respectively. Cardiac arrest occurred in 13 (3.4%) of incidents, with a rate of 3 per 10,000 anaesthetics.
Among the final incident outcomes were eight patient deaths, either in the operating room or in the intensive care unit. All these incidents and mortalities involved emergency surgery and anaesthesia, were considered as unpreventable and were not due to any deficiencies in anaesthesia care. The main contributing factor was the severely ill or moribund condition of the patients prior to anaesthesia, with seven out of eight patients graded as ASA 5E. There only one other death in an ASA 2E patient, and the surgical procedure was considered a contributing factor. In 42 other incidents, the patients had unplanned intensive care or high dependency unit admission and all these patients survived. Major morbidity, most of which had necessitated intensive care or high dependency unit admission, included major haemorrhage, anaphylactic shock, malignant hyperthermia, epidural haematoma, acute coronary syndrome, pulmonary embolism and venous air embolism. One incident classified as resulting in major morbidity was of eye injury from the application of the Mayfield head clamp. There were eight incidents of dental trauma. In four of these patients, there were pre-existing dental problems of rotting teeth, loose teeth and poor oral hygiene. Other minor morbidities included mild pulmonary aspiration, skin injuries from tapes and pressure and warming devices, airway bleeding and lip trauma from airway management, fluid overload and extravasation of intravenous fluids.
The data on the predictive factors of the critical incidents is presented in Table 6 . Factors that were associated with a higher number of incidents were poor ASA physical status, increased duration of anaesthesia and surgery and afterhours anaesthesia.
Discussion
This review of the profile of critical incidents, contributing and mitigating factors over two years, showed a rate of 0.84%. For the incidents resulting in major morbidity, it was difficult to attribute the morbidity to anaesthesia alone, as there were multiple contributing factors, in particular, patients' coexisting morbidities and surgical factors.
The most common critical incidents were airway incidents (55.7%); this proportion was higher than other published data ranging between 17% and 34% 3, 4 . A large number (64 of 211) of these airway incidents involved laryngospasm. In most of these cases, laryngospasm was recognised early enough to prevent adverse outcomes. Contributory factors for laryngospasm incidents were mainly inadequate anaesthesia and we suggest that more attention to ensuring adequate depth of anaesthesia is needed in anticipation of surgical stimulation.
Incidents were more common with worsening ASA physical status, concurring with earlier reports [5] [6] [7] . Incidents were also more common with long duration of anaesthesia and surgery, and after-hours anaesthesia. Emergency procedures in our series were not associated with higher risk. As far as possible in our hospital, urgent and emergency operations were carried out during normal working hours, in two dedicated 24-hour emergency operating rooms.
In our audit, human factors and human errors were the major causes of anaesthesia-related critical incidents. This concurs with earlier studies [8] [9] [10] . Errors of judgement and inattention to detail, while not justifiable, were understandable in many incidents. In some cases, the anaesthetists were multi-tasking. Inattention also contributed to failure to check drugs and equipment, and hence drug and equipment incidents, faulty technique and inappropriate response to monitors. Our system of reporting and review aimed to reduce the problems of inaccurate recall and to enable early advice after the incidents to other staff if necessary 11 . The main limitation is under-reporting. While our current rate of 0.84% is comparable to some reports of 0.28% to 2.8% 12, 13 , much higher rates of up to 12.1% and 10.6% 5, 14 have been reported. Under-reporting could be due to reluctance to report seemingly minor events. Attitudes, thresholds and motivation for reporting incidents vary among doctors, even within the same department. Interpretation of incidents varies, and what may be deemed as critical by one anaesthetist may be accepted by another as part of 'normal' intraoperative variation. It is also possible that some major incidents were unreported due to lack of motivation, lack of acceptance that incident reporting helps in education and prevention of future incidents 15 or fear of disciplinary or other adverse action. A limitation to the generalisability of our findings is that, in Singapore, anaesthesia care is provided by physicians only and countries with nonphysician anaesthesia providers may have a different profile of incidents. A third limitation is that our audit system does not include data of patients post discharge from the postanaesthesia care unit. Hence, this review did not evaluate later problems in the ward or at home.
Within our own hospital, the previous reported rate of critical incidents ten years ago was 0.37% 16 . The previous anonymous reporting system used the Australasian Anaesthetic Incident Monitoring Study forms 2 , which were kept in the operating rooms and anaesthetists had to drop the completed forms in a box in the department office. With the new 100% procedural audit forms incorporating space for the description of any incidents, it is now more convenient for our anaesthetists to report incidents. This could have contributed to the increased reporting rate. This new system captured substantially more information, in a structured manner, on patient comorbidities and anaesthesia technique and drugs used.
While the audit forms and critical incident reports were not anonymous, the presentations and discussions of the incidents were anonymised. Reporting increased even though the anaesthetists' medical council registration numbers were noted on the audit forms. The anaesthetists could be identified and contacted for further information in order to help in educating the department. Many of the anaesthetists involved freely volunteered information and suggestions at the critical incident discussions. We have emphasised a culture of open and 'blame-free' discussion and suggest that this also encouraged, rather than deterred, incident reporting in our system.
Human factors and errors in anaesthesia are often identifiable, predictable and repetitive and, like others, we have made reviewing critical incidents a key component for improving patient safety and prevention of recurrences [17] [18] [19] [20] . Our department put in much effort to mitigate some of the human factors in response to reviews of the incidents. The first step was to recognise that any system operated by human beings is subject to human error; this is to be expected. Measures to mitigate risk include pairing of anaesthetists in the operating room and rostering adequate manpower at times of heavy task load and prolonged surgery. Manpower was organised to ensure adequate supervision of junior doctors. We have also instituted training with simulators for all trainees, both individually and in teams, to manage critical situations such as malignant hyperpyrexia and anaphylaxis and for subspecialty work in cardiac, paediatric and liver transplant anaesthesia.
We have implemented pre-induction checklists (Table  7) which check, in particular, for the possibility of difficult airway management and emphasise any known drug allergy, prior to induction. Improved awareness of critical incidents can improve safety 12 . The pre-induction check is in addition to the daily machine check and the surgical 'time-out' Table 7 Pre-induction anaesthesia check list before skin incision. This pre-induction checklist specifically reminds anaesthetists to check for these anaesthesia concerns, including difficult airways, drug allergies, functioning of monitors and to prepare for problems before induction of anaesthesia.
Conclusion
In summary, this audit shows the range of critical incidents in a department of anaesthesia providing tertiary care. The majority of the incidents were preventable and human errors were the main contributing factors. Although reporting was not de-identified, this did not seem to discourage incident reporting and the rate of reporting had increased to 0.84% compared to the previous rate of 0.37%.
